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Judicial Independence, Judicial
Responsibility: A District
Judge's Perspective
Joan Humphrey Lefkow*
As many of you are aware, two-and-a-half years ago I was unexpectedly
and unwillingly vaulted into the public eye when tragedy struck my family and
me. On February 28, 2005, a pro se litigant broke into my home in the middle
of the night and lay in wait with a plan to kill me because I had dismissed his
case. I will not elaborate, but suffice it to say, the cruel hand of Fate passed
over me and took the lives of my husband and my aged mother, who was
visiting in our home. By this inexplicable chain of events, I am here today to
speak with you. As you can readily imagine, this has been a cataclysm in my
life and in those of my children that one could never overestimate. I speak of it
now only because it was the launch from which I began to think about judicial
independence.
After the funerals, my youngest daughter and I remained in seclusion
under the protection of the United States Marshals Service for a number of
weeks. One of the things I did from time to time to distract myself during those
days was turn on the television. The biggest story during March of 2005 was
another family's tragedy, that of Theresa Schiavo, who according to news
accounts had been in a persistent vegetative state for fifteen years.' The privacy
one would hope for in such a situation was lost to an appalling feeding frenzy
in which all the news channels and their pundits weighed in on either side of a
bitter legal battle between those who claimed to love her most. The dispute that
brought the parties to court was whether Schiavo, had she been able, would
have chosen death over life in her circumstances. 2 Merely to state the issue
illustrates the paradox it presented.

* Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. This text was
delivered as the annual John Randolph Tucker Lecture at the Washington and Lee School of
Law in October 2007.
1. Abby Goodnough & Carl Hulse, Despite Congress, Woman's Feeding Tube is
Removed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at Al.
2. See id. (describing how Ms. Schiavo had left no instructions on whether she would
want to be reliant on feeding tubes to survive).
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The Florida courts ruled in favor of her appointed guardian, her husband,
who after ten years had petitioned the court for an order that a feeding tube that
kept his wife alive be removed.3 The opinion of Judge Chris Altenbernd of the
Florida Appellate Court is nothing if not respectful of the parties to the case and
the heartrending situation the family had endured.4 And I should imagine that
most of us lawyers who followed the case, whether closely or out of one ear,
assumed that the Florida courts were where the case belonged.
Nevertheless, as happened with the pro se litigant in my personal situation,
the losing party, the parents of Ms. Schiavo, headed to federal court as the court
of last resort.5 But because of the doctrines the courts have developed to deal
with the dual jurisdictional structure we have in the United States, there was
little hope that a federal court lawsuit seeking to override the Florida court's
judgment could get past the front door. Responding to the publicity and outcry
from interest groups, on March 21, 2005, Congress set those obstacles aside,
passing a law granting to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida jurisdiction to hear and determine any federal claim filed by
or on behalf of Theresa Marie Schiavo relating to the withholding or
withdrawal of nutrition or treatment necessary to sustain her life.6 The door to
federal court opened.
Schiavo's parents relied on the constitutional right to substantive due
process, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and some
3. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *7
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) ("[T]he Petition for Authorization to Discontinue Artificial Life
Support of Michael Schiavo, Guardian of the Person of Theresa Marie Schiavo ... is hereby
granted.. . ."), af'd,780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
4. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177-78. For example, the court stated:
Many patients in this condition would have been abandoned by friends and family
within the first year. Michael has continued to care for her and to visit her all these
years. He has never divorced her. He has become a professional respiratory
therapist and works in a nearby hospital. As a guardian, he has always attempted to
provide optimum treatment for his wife.
Theresa's parents have continued to love her and visit her often. No one
questions the sincerity of their prayers for the divine miracle that now is Theresa's
only hope to regain any level of normal existence. No one questions that they have
filed this appeal out of love for their daughter.
Id.
5. See Schiavo ex. rel Schiavo v. Greer, No. 8:05-CV-522-T-30TGW, 2005 WL 754121,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2005) (denying petitioners' Emergency Petition for Temporary
Injunction and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus), vacated,2005 WL 2240351, at * 1 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 21, 2005).
6. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15 (2005).
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statutory claims.7 On March 22, the district court denied a motion for a
temporary restraining order because it found that the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits of any of their federal
claims. 8 Schiavo's parents appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on
March 23.9 Petitions for rehearing were denied, and the Supreme Court of the
United States denied a stay on March 24.10
The heartbreaking divide within the Schiavo family became a symbol for
the divide within American society over what is characterized as either the right
to life or the right to choose, depending on one's point of view. 11 It became a
political drama of outsized proportions. Although the rulings of the federal
courts were paradigms ofjudicial restraint, many intemperate things were said
about so-called activistjudges. One senator made the following statement from
the floor on April 4, 2005: "I wonder whether there may be some connection
between the perception in some quarters on some occasions where judges are
making political decisions yet are unaccountable to the public, that it builds up
and builds up and builds up to the point where some people engage in, engage
in violence." 12
Let me pause a moment to state that I took Senator Comyn's remarks
personally, as I was certainly entitled to do based on his timing, as was the
by a criminal
family of Judge Rowland Barnes of Atlanta, who was murdered
13
defendant in his own courtroom less than one month earlier.
On May 18, 2005, I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
concerning judicial security. 14 I called on the committee members and other
elected leaders to "publicly and persistently repudiate gratuitous attacks on the
judiciary."' 15 At the time, I was referring to the senator's and other lawmakers'
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1384 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
Id. at 1388.
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1237 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 945, 945 (2005).
See, e.g., Shaila Dewan et al., States Taking a New Look at End-of-Life Legislation,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at A14 (discussing the debate over end-of-life decisions that arose
as a result of the Theresa Schiavo case).
12. Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to "Political"Decisions, WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 2005, at A.
13.

See Manuel Roig-Franzia &Melanie LasoffLevs, Three Slain in Atlanta Courthouse

Rampage, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2005, at Al (detailing the courthouse shooting in which Judge

Barnes died).
14.

Protectingthe Judiciaryat Home and in the Courthouse: Hearings Before the S.

Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6-13 (2005) [hereinafter Protecting the Judiciary]

(statement of Joan H. Lefkow, United States District J.).
15. Id.at 10.
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verbal attacks on judges and also to the outsized statements of people like
television evangelist Pat Robertson, who on May 1, 2005, opined that federal
judges pose a threat "probably more serious than a few bearded terrorists who
fly into buildings."' 6 I said at that time:
It seems to me that even though we cannot prove a cause and effect
relationship between rhetorical attacks on judges and violent acts of
vengeance by a particular litigant, fostering disrespect for judges can only
encourage those that are on the edge, or the fringe, to exact revenge on a
judge who ruled against them.17
Since those awful days, I have tuned in to the anti-judge, anti-court clatter
and have found it to be more pervasive than I had expected. Although much of
what was broadcast on television and on the Internet was dismissible as
commercial demagoguery, when words such as "punishing" judges, 8 "mass
impeachment" of judges,' 9 and getting judges "in line, 20 by drying up the
judiciary's budget started to come from elected leaders, responsible members of
the bench and bar were legitimately alarmed.
That summer, Tom DeLay, the House Majority Leader, gave a speech to
more than 3,000 evangelicals gathered for Justice Sunday in Nashville in
anticipation of the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Roberts.2 1 He
accused the Supreme Court of overstepping its lawful authority by making law
rather than interpreting law, adding his voice to the likes of James Dobson, the
political activist/child psychologist, who stated: "Almost all of the great moral
and social issues of our time are decided not by the voters but by an unelected,
unaccountable
and often arrogant judiciary. We call that effort judicial
22
tyranny.
Now, thanks principally to the federal courts, Mr. Robertson (who is, I
understand, a graduate of this university) and Dr. Dobson have a right to say
16. Interview by George Stephanopoulos with Reverend Pat Robertson, Chairman,
Christian Broad. Network, on ABC News (ABC television broadcast May 2005), availableat
http://www.patrobertson.com/PressReleases/thisweekgs.asp (last visited Feb. 27,2008) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. Protectingthe Judiciary,supranote 14, at 12.
18. The Honorable James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Zale
Lecture in Public Policy at Stanford University (May 9, 2005), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/stanfordjudgesspeechpressversion5S05.pdf.
19. Ruth Marcus, Booting the Bench, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2005, at A 19.
20. Id.
21. Kathy Lohr, Christian Telecast Educates Faithful on High Court (NPR radio
broadcast Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=4800037 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
22. Id.
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what they think, even irresponsible things. I felt when I testified, however, and
I feel today, that a public official is in a different category. We should expect
restraint from a person who commands the respect of the office of senator or
congressman. Likewise, I hope that members, and future members, of the bar,
including those who are here today, will do their part not to let such statements
go unchallenged.
After her retirement from the United States Supreme Court, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor began to speak publicly of her concern about what she
characterized as threats to judicial independence. As reported on National
Public Radio, during a speech at Georgetown University Law Center on March
6, 2006, she said, "It doesn't help... when a high-profile senator suggests
there may be a connection between violence against judges and decisions that
the senator disagrees with. ''23 According to the report:
"I," said O'Connor, "am against judicial reforms driven by nakedly partisan
reasoning." Pointing to the experiences of developing countries and former
communist countries, where interference with an independent judiciary has
allowed dictatorship to flourish, O'Connor said, "We must be ever-vigilant
against those who would strong-arm the judiciary into adopting their
preferred policies. It takes a lot of degeneration before a country falls into
dictatorship, but we should avoid these ends by avoiding these
beginnings." 24
The Justice O'Connor speech led to the formation of the Sandra Day
O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary at Georgetown University Law
Center.25 A conference was held during September 2006, where many highly
respected and knowledgeable participants engaged in a discussion of whether
and to what extent the independence of the judiciary in America is under
siege.2 6
23. Nina Totenberg, Morning Edition: O'ConnorDecriesRepublicanAttacks on Courts
(NPR radio broadcast Mar. 10, 2006), availableat http://npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
ID=-5255712 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
24. Id.
25. See Press Release, Georgetown University Law Center, Georgetown Law Establishes
Sandra Day O'Connor Project on State of the Judiciary (Feb. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/February.13.2007.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2008) (announcing the establishment of the Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the
Judiciary) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See generally Panel Remarks, JudicialIndependence: Justifications and Modern
Criticisms, at the Georgetown University Law Center and American Law Institute Conference
on Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary (Sept. 28, 2006)
(transcript available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/COJ092806-panel 1.
pdf). The panelists were: C. Boyden Gray, United States Ambassador to the European Union;
Jack N. Rakove, Professor of History and Political Science at Stanford University; Kathleen M.
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On March 19, 2007, in a speech given at the University of Virginia School
of Law, William H. Pryor, Jr., a judge of the Federal Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit who took the bench in 2004, emphatically diminished the
efforts of Justice O'Connor.27 Stating that "talk ofjudicial independence is all
the rage," he took the position that judicial independence is alive and well.28
Judge Pryor argued from history, citing three important occasions when
the independence of the judiciary was under attack.29 In short, the first crisis of
judicial independence, he said, was when newly elected President Thomas
Jefferson refused to deliver the commissions for new judgeships created under
the Judiciary Act of 1801, giving rise to Marbury v. Madison,30 the seminal
case credited with establishing the doctrine of judicial review. 31 The second
was during Reconstruction when the Republican Congress repealed the Court's
appellate jurisdiction in response to the DredScot? 2 decision. 33 The third was
the infamous court-packing scheme initiated by President Roosevelt. 34 In each
instance, Judge Pryor argued that the Supreme Court acted with restraint, and
through a fortuitous confluence of events, Congress acted or refrained from
acting such that the Court's independence was not compromised.35 Although
there is no provable cause and effect, Judge Pryor conceded, he observed that
after each of these crises, by exercising restraint, the Court enjoyed greater
deference as an independent branch of government. 36 As he saw it, the "tested
method of defending our independence" is "to respect the limits of our
authority."37
Sullivan, Professor and Director of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center; and Pierre Thomas,
ABC News Justice Correspondent.
27.

See Emily Williams, Judicial Independence Safe, Pryor Says, Mar. 23, 2007,

availableat http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2007_spr/pryor.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2008) (reporting that Judge Pryor believes that Justice O'Connor is "pointing out problems that
are non-issues") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. William H. Pryor, Jr., Essay, Not-So-Serious Threats to JudicialIndependence, 93
VA. L. REV. 1759, 1759 (2007).
29. See id.
at 1767-74 (discussing the "Jeffersonian Challenge," the "Reconstruction
Challenge," and the "New Deal Challenge").
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
31. Pryor, supranote 28, at 1767-70.
32. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
33. Pryor, supra note 28, at 1771.
34. Id.
at 1772.
35. Id.
at 1773.
36. See id.
at 1762-63 ("I submit that the independence of the federal judiciary today is as
secure as ever.").
37. Id.
at 1763.
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By comparison, Judge Pryor asserted, "contemporary challenges are not
serious. 3 8 He acknowledged a rather long list of efforts to "rein in" the
judiciary.39 One of the most dramatic was an initiative to amend the
constitution of South Dakota to repeal judicial immunity, popularly known as
"J.A.I.L. 4 Judges." 40 That failed,4' as did bills in Congress that would have
forbidden the federal courts from relying on foreign law.42 Some other
unsuccessful initiatives that Judge Pryor mentioned were bills to create an
inspector general for the judiciary,43 threats of budget cuts, and efforts to
remove the courts' jurisdiction to hear certain matters. He dismissed stagnation
of judicial compensation and threats of, and violence against, judges as
unfortunate but not serious threats to judicial independence and insisted that the
current assaults on the judiciary are appropriate and necessary to thriving public
discourse and, fundamentally, to democracy. 44 Verbal attacks are, after all, not
defiance. Pitched battles over appointments are (1) child's play compared to
running for office and (2) appropriate because a great deal is at stake. One gets
the sense that Judge Pryor believes that if the courts simply wait it out, the
legislatures will end up doing the right thing, so all's right with the judiciary, if
not the whole world.
Is the talk of threats to judicial independence much ado about nothing?
"Crisis" is a dramatic term. Certainly, the furor around the Schiavo case and
the political fallout that caused Justice O'Connor's alarm have subsided, and
some of the anti-court initiatives have died or been put'aside, primarily because

at 1764.
38. Id.
at 1774.
39. Id.
40. Id.at 1779.
41. See S.D. Sec'y of State, General Election Official Returns for Ballot Questions
(2006), http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/pastelectionselectioninfo06_GEballot
questions.shtm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (showing the official voting results for ballot
questions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1070, 109th
Cong. (2005). The Constitution Restoration Act would have prohibited the courts, in
interpreting the Constitution, from relying on any foreign sources of law other than English
constitutional and common law up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution. S.520 § 201;
H.R. 1070 § 201.
43. Pryor, supranote 28, at 1760-61. For one example of such a legislative attempt, see
The Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5219, 109th Cong.
(2005). Introduced by Congressman James Sensenbrenner, this bill proposed oversight of the
judiciary by creating an Office of the Inspector General to investigate "possible misconduct in
office ofjudges," "prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse," and "recommend changes in
laws or regulations governing the Judicial Branch." H.R. 5219 § 2. For the Senate counterpart,
introduced by Senator Charles Grassley, see S.2678, 109th Cong. (2005).
44. Pryor, supra note 28, at 1763.
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of the changing tides of American politics, especially the 2006 election and recent
Supreme Court appointments.
To move forward in the discussion ofjudicial independence, we first need to
address the increasing confusion ofwhat the term really means. Michael Traynor,
President of the American Law Institute, stated at the 2006 Georgetown conference:
The term judicial independence is widely misunderstood. To some,
independence connotes inappropriate activism, requests to create law unbound
by the constraints of statutes or common law preceden[ts]. For many thoughtful
people, it is an "I know it when I see it" kind of term. Like the elusive phrase
"sustainable development" in environmental discussions, it reflects values that
are important45to the people who hold them, even though they may not agree
about details.
To lawyers, judicial independence is something quite distinct from that: It is
the notion that, in order for judges to exercise their office without fear or
favor, they have to be protected from adverse consequences for making an
unpopular decision. Naturally, the legislatures are going to enact laws in
response to their constituencies, but the courts are to be a restraint on the
excesses of the legislature.46
At its heart, America understands this. The great journalist Edward R.
Murrow, who is best known for his role in bringing down the excesses of anti-

45. John J. Degioia, President, Georgetown Univ., Remarks at the Georgetown University
Law Center and American Law Institute Conference on Fair and Independent Courts: A
Conference on the State of the Judiciary 4 (Sept. 28, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/CoJ092806-degioia.pdf).
46. In the words of Jack N. Rakove, who spoke at the Conference on the State of the
Judiciary:
[T]he concept ofjudicial independence.., emerges as a kind of complement to the
recognition, which... [James] Madison [was] originally the leading spokesman
for, that legislatures... from 1776 on... [were] going to be the real locus of
republican politics. And they're going to act impetuously, as Madison believe[d]
they had acted during the revolution, enacting too many laws, too mutable laws,
and potentially enacting unjust laws. And some further check needs to be provided
against their excesses, against their dangers[,] than simply their election by the
people.
So it's important to recognize that the idea of an independent judiciary emerges
in opposition to-and in a sense, almost in conflict with-this recognition of the
sway of legislative power. And the obvious inference to be drawn from that is that
one would want to be careful, if that's your initial formulation of an independent
judiciary, about reading the legislative mandate to regulate or oversee the judiciary
too broadly. That would cut against the grain of this original impulse.
Jack N. Rakove, Professor of History and Political Sci. at Stanford Univ., Remarks at the
Georgetown University Law Center and American Law Institute Conference on Fair and
Independent Courts, supranote 26, at 4.
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communist fervor most famously embodied in Wisconsin's Senator Joe
McCarthy, said: "The only thing that counts is the right to know, to speak,4 7to
think-that, and the sanctity of the courts. Otherwise it's not America."
"Sanctity," according to Webster's Dictionary, means "the quality or
state of being holy or sacred., 48 Sacred is a thought-provoking word. The
late philosopher Mortimer Adler, in We Hold These Truths, identified judicial
review (the reason judicial independence matters) as the "legal remedy for the
tyranny of the majority in the operation of constitutional government." 49 He
states:
The remedy that preserves the principle of majority rule while at the
same time nullifying unjust laws approved by a legislative majority was
found by our ancestors in the power of the Supreme Court to review the
acts of government, executive as well as legislative, and to declare them
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.50
Think of cases such as Schware v. Boardof Bar Examiners of New
Mexico, 51 where the inestimable Justice Black announced that a bar
applicant's long past membership in the Communist Party, prior arrests
(that did not result in trials or convictions), and the past use of aliases did
not raise substantial doubts as to the applicant's good moral character;
thus, to deny him the opportunity to take the bar exam was a denial of
due process.5 2 The image this case evokes of the federal court staying the
hand of popular will to vindicate the right of freedom of association is
one that is, by now, deeply engraved in the American consciousness.
Lest those of us who labor in the district courts be overlooked, I commend to
all Jack Bass's marvelous book, Unlikely Heroes, described on the cover as "[a]
vivid account of the implementation of the Brown decision in the South by
southern federal judges committed to the rule of law. 5 3 Consider the life of
Judge Skelly Wright, who in his own heart came to grips with injustice during a
Christmas Eve party for the United States Attorney's Office as he watched
47. Joseph Wershba, Edward R. Morrow and the Time of His Time, EVE'S MAG.,
http://www.evesmag.com/murrow.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
48. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2009 (2002).
49. MORTIMER J. ADLER, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 101 (1987).
50. Id.
51. See Schware v. Bd.of Bar Examiners ofN.M., 353 U.S. 232,247(1957) ("[W]e hold
that the State of New Mexico deprived petitioner of due process in denying him the opportunity
to qualify for the practice of law.").
52. Id. at 246-47.
53. JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
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through a window the Lighthouse for the Blind across the street holding a
segregated holiday party.54 Eventually, he, through courageous adherence to
the law, endured being "the most hated man in New Orleans" for ordering
desegregation of the schools. 55 Again, few nowadays would deny the
justness or rightness of Judge Wright's rulings. No matter the public outrage
at the time, these judges were not removed from office; their pay was not
diminished; they were not impeached.
I agree with Judge Pryor (as does Justice O'Connor, I am confident) that
where federal judges are concerned, we are independent in our
decisionmaking. As individual judges, we are not subject to official
retribution for ruling as we believe the law commands. So long as security
concerns are attended to, I agree with Judge Pryor (as does Justice O'Connor)
that the public must be free to rant and rave about judicial decisions if they
want to. Some of that ranting is fully justified because judges do sometimes
get carried away with their own importance. Judges do, no matter how
conscientious, make bad decisions from time to time. I agree that federal
judicial appointments are sufficiently important that they deserve thorough
debate. I agree that judges typically act with restraint to avoid confrontations
with the legislature and the President over boundaries. And I agree that
"judicial restraint" is-on the whole-good for America, as are legislative
restraint and executive restraint in those branches' relations with each other
and with the judiciary.
On the other hand, I submit that Judge Pryor unjustifiably minimizes
some troubling signs for our independent judiciary. First is the issue of
jurisdiction stripping. By jurisdiction stripping, I mean legislation that
deprives the federal courts of the power to hear certain categories of cases, so
as to deny federal courts the power to interpret constitutional law. As I read
the newspapers and some of the academic literature-and believe me, I am
neither an intellectual, nor an academic, nor do I spend my time researching
this-it strikes me that jurisdiction stripping is important because it is a form
of collective, or institutional, retribution that is erosive of the judicial branch
of government.
According to a document dated September 28, 2004, under the heading
United States Senate, Republican Policy Committee and titled The Casefor
Jurisdiction-StrippingLegislation: Restoring Popular Control of the
Constitution,the proposition is laid down that "[t]he American people must
have a remedy when they believe that federal courts have overreached and
54.
55.

Id.at 112.
Id. at 112-35.
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interpreted the Constitution in ways that are fundamentally at odds with the
people's common constitutional understandings and expectations. 5 6 The
remedy proposed is "to eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts over
particular issues."5 7 According to this paper, more than fifty such bills have
been introduced since the mid-1970s relating to voluntary prayer in public
buildings, abortion, religious liberty, and the protection of traditional
marriage. 58 The proposal mentioned above-that would have prohibited the
courts in interpreting the Constitution from relying on any foreign sources of
law except English constitutional and common law up to the time of the
adoption of the Constitution-also would have stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear cases seeking relief in relation to a governmental actor's
"acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or
government. 5 9 Furthermore, if a judge were to exceed these jurisdictional
limitations, the bill provided that such activity would60be an impeachable
offense and a breach of the standard of good behavior.
As Judge Pryor said in his speech, it's much easier to propose legislation
than to get it passed. 6' The majority of the members of Congress, in both
parties, respects what the courts do and is loath to tamper with the Third
Branch. These initiatives have receded from view for the present, at least.
On the other hand, over the past couple of decades a considerable amount of
jurisdiction-stripping legislation has been passed that has reduced the power
56. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., 108TH CONG., THE CASE FOR JURISDICTIONSTRIPPING LEGISLATION: RESTORING POPULAR CONTROL OF THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2004),

availableat http://www.rpc.senate.gov/_files/Sept2804CourtStrippingSD.pdf(last visited Mar.
4, 2008).
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 8. As an example, a House bill introduced during the 109th Congress in 2005
would have stripped the federal courts of their jurisdiction (including Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction) to hear cases relating to the Pledge of Allegiance. Pledge Protection Act of 2005,
H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Protect the Pledge Act of 2003, S. 1297, 108th Cong.
(2003) (proposing substantially the same measure). Another bill would have prohibited any
court from hearing or deciding any question pertaining to the interpretation or validity of the
Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R.
1100, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
59. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 101(a)(1) (2004).
60. See id. § 302 (discussing judicial penalties). The bill specifically states:
To the extent that a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or any judge
of any Federal court engages in any activity that exceeds the jurisdiction of the
court of that justice or judge,.., engaging in that activity shall be deemed to
constitute the commission of... an offense for which the judge may be removed
upon impeachment and conviction.
Id.
61. Pryor, supra note 28, at 1779.
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of federal courts, in areas such as criminal sentencing,6 2 speedy trials,6 3 the
64
circumstances in which the writ of habeas corpus may be granted,
administrative actions in immigration proceedings,65 and prison reform.6 6
Congress last year shifted from the federal courts to the Attorney General the
determination of whether a state has established a mechanism for providing for
competent
counsel to indigents in post-conviction proceedings in capital
67
cases.

At the top of the news is the Military Commissions Act of 2006.68
Broadly stated, this law denies to persons the President designates as "enemy
combatants" access to federal courts to challenge their detention. 69 It is being
challenged in Boumediene v. Bush.70 The question as framed by the D.C.
Circuit was: "Do federal courts have jurisdiction over petitions for writs of
habeas corpus filed by aliens captured abroad and detained as enemy
combatants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba? 71 The court
answered the question "no," holding that the Military Commissions Act, in
depriving the federal courts ofjurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions,
does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.72 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and oral argument was held on December 5, 2007.73 It
62. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000) (establishing guidelines for courts to consider
when determining criminal sentences), invalidatedinpartby United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005).
63. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
64. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2000) (preventing federal courts from granting writs of
habeas in enemy combatant cases).
65. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act dramatically
restricted federal judicial review for death row inmates and for many immigrants facing
deportation. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-607 to -612 (1996) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000)).
66. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-71 to
-72 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000)).
67. See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 507, 120 Stat. 192, 250 (2006) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.§§ 2261,2265) (authorizing
Attorney General review of the state mechanisms for providing counsel).
68. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
69. Id. § 948a, 120 Stat. at 2601; id. § 948b, 120 Stat. at 2602.
70. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 3078
(June 29, 2007).
71. Id. at 984.
72. See id. at 991-92 ("Precedent in this court and the Supreme Court holds that the
Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence within the United
States."). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2.
73. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S.Ct. 3078 (2007).

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY

373

will be very revealing to watch what happens in this case, in terms of how the
Roberts Court will measure the balance between the executive and the courts.
(I do not miss the point that the Court decides this issue in the end.) Whatever
the wisdom of these laws as a policy matter, I do think they show it is not fair to
say that jurisdiction-stripping is all talk and no action.
More broadly, there is a school of thought that would eliminate the lower
federal courts' jurisdiction over classes of cases interpreting the constitution
and rest that responsibility in the state courts.74 Then, at the state level, the
push is to make judges more "responsible to the electorate" by replacing
appointive systems with judicial elections, cutting terms of appellate judges in
Colorado, 75 and through the campaign lovingly branded as "J.A.I.L. 4 Judges"
to eliminate judicial immunity and allow judges to be censured for their
rulings.76 Probably unrealistic. Yet, we judges and lawyers need to pay
attention to these movements, as they say something important about change in
the body politic. Ultimately, the consent of the governed is necessary for
democratic institutions to survive. Here I quote an American Bar Association
paper: "That is especially true of the judiciary, which controls neither the
sword nor the purse and must depend on public acceptance for its continued
77
existence as an independent branch of government.
74.

The 2004 Senate Republican Policy Committee Report stated:
A bill to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts could take two basic forms:
In one form, ajurisdiction-stripping statute could limit the jurisdiction of lower
federal courts to hear a certain class of dispute, but leave untouched the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In that circumstance, a litigant with a claim
based on a federal statute or constitutional provision would bring his case in state
court, and after exhausting all appeals in the state court system, seek review from
the U.S. Supreme Court. This approach would prevent judges in the lower federal
courts from announcing unpopular and unwise constitutional rulings that impact
several states' citizens ....
The other option is to craft a statute that would abolish both lower court and
Supreme Court jurisdiction over a particular issue or class of cases. Thus, the
litigant would bring his claim to the state courts, and the final decision would rest
with the highest court in that state to review the dispute ....
SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., supra note 56, at 5-6.
75. According to Justice at Stake, who initiated these efforts: "Two sides combined to spend
over $2.5 million on this citizen ballot initiative...." JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at viii (2006), available at http://justiceatstake.
org/files/NewPoliticsofludicialElections2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2008). Constitutional
Amendment 40 would have limited the number of terms appellate judges could serve, reduced their
term lengths from ten to four years, mandated retirement of any appellate judge who had already
served ten years, and required all others to stand for retention in November 2008. Id. at 50.
76. Supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
77. COMM'N ON THE 21 ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, AM. BAR ASS'N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 2
(2003) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], availableat http://www.abanet.org/judind/j eopardy/pdf/
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A thorough and thoughtful study of the state of the American judiciary
done by the American Bar Association several years ago attributed skepticism
about the courts to two trends: "'a general decline of confidence in the major
institutions of American society' and the 'lessons of legal realism,' which have
filtered down from the legal community to the general public .. .,7 The study
further noted, "[T]he secret is out .... Judges 7in9 the United States make law
and the people in the United States know that.
I don't think it is fair to characterize what judges do as "making law,"
although ultimately, in the appellate courts and the Supreme Court, by
interpreting the law as the Court understands it, and by being the last word on
saying what the law is or means, that can amount to making law.
As for me, I decide cases. I deal with human beings. They may be aliens
without documents or corporate executives. The parents of a seventh grader
contend it is against their religious beliefs to allow their child to wear a school
uniform.80 They file a lawsuit under the First Amendment. 8' A journalist
believes the First Amendment means that he should be able to see the citizen
complaint registers for police officers. 82 A woman whose car is impounded by
the police because her son was arrested for driving on a suspended license,
even though she can lawfully drive the car, claims deprivation of due process. 83
We judges don't invite these cases. The people come to us. The courts are an
incredibly democratic institution. The executive and the legislative branches by
their nature deal with large groups and rules of broad application. But anyone
can file a lawsuit and have their individual situation considered. That is grass
roots democracy.
Despite the enormous contribution that universal access to justice makes
to a civil society, when a decision grabs the attention of a particular interest
group, often because it is exceptional (remember the hot coffee at
report.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
78. Id. at 17 (quoting G. ALANTARRETAL., STATE HIGH COURTS INSTATE ANDNATION 49
(1988)).
79. Id.
80. See Levon v. O'Rourke, No. 96-C-7304, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19378, at *27 (N.D.
I11. Dec. 24, 1996) (denying a request for an injunction seeking to prevent a local school district
from enforcing its school uniform policy against a seventh grade student).
81. Id. at *15.
82. See Bond v. Utreras, No. 04-C-2617, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48914, at * 15 (N.D. I11.
July 2, 2007) (granting a journalist's motion to unseal public documents relating to alleged
police misconduct).
83. See Harrington v. Heavey, No. 04-C-5991, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84964, at *18
(N.D. I11.Nov. 16, 2006) (finding that the seizure of the vehicle violated the plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights, without addressing the plaintiff's due process claim).
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McDonald's), 84 press releases are cranked out and suddenly the media are "all
over it," as our young people say. 85 The ability for information to flow
instantaneously and the message to be molded to serve the goals of single-issue
interest groups has led to something new and quite effective in contributing to
the erosion of confidence that judges are ruling according to law rather than
their personal beliefs.
Another factor, undoubtedly, is a disconnect between who our judges are
(overwhelmingly white, non-Hispanic) and the steadily declining share of the
population that we white, non-Hispanics comprise. According to one poll, 85%
of African Americans believe that "there are two systems of justice-one for
the rich and powerful, and one for everyone else."8 6 Hispanics, likewise, have
less confidence in the courts than white, non-Hispanics. 87 According to the
National Center for State Courts, a majority of whites believe judges are fair
and impartial, while a majority of African Americans (55%) believe they are
not fair and impartial. 8 Apart from ethnicity, dramatic and rapid economic
changes due to the global economy have left many people feeling insecure,
afraid, and betrayed for the lost prosperity they expected based on the comfort
of their parents' generation. As the ABA report put it: "To the extent that
significant segments of the public think that judges are captured by special
interests, controlled by the wealthy and powerful, and unconcerned about the
and political minorities, our system ofjustice is in very
rights of racial, ethnic,
89
serious trouble.
It is a complex dynamic. One idea that seems counter, however, to what
lawyers and judges on the whole accept is the idea that case outcomes ought to
comport with what the electorate would prefer. On this note, I heartily agree
with Justice O'Connor, that we have failed to properly educate our citizenry

84. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309, at *1(N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (announcing ajury verdict awarding the plaintiff
$160,000 in compensatory damages and $2,700,000 in punitive damages for injuries received
from spilled hot coffee).
85. See generally Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee
Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al; Hot Coffee Spill Worth Cool
Award, McDonald's May Fork Over $2.9 Million, DENV. POST, Aug. 19, 1994, at A12; Java

Jive, MiAMi HERALD, Aug. 27, 1994, at 30A; Rick Van Warner, Editorial, The Legal Wheel of
FortuneIs Spinning Out of Control,NATION'S

RESTAURANT NEWS,

Sept. 12, 1994, at 47.

86. ABA REPORT, supranote 77, at 41.
87. See id.at 42 ("[W]hile 34 percent of non-Hispanic whites 'strongly agreed' that
'[j]udges are generally honest and fair in deciding cases,' the percentage declined to 29 percent
for Hispanics.").
88. Id.
89. Id.
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about the role of the courts as a counterweight that can absorb minority views
and respond by protecting their basic civil rights.
It is for us judges, particularly those of us who serve on the front lines of
justice in the trial courts, to be continually aware of how our conduct affects the
public so as to maintain and continually earn the confidence and respect of the
public. I do not mean that we should waver from our allegiance to the rule of
law or bend to popular opinion. But we can do things that make sure that
people who appear before us, and the public that watches what we do, see that
litigants are treated fairly and given voice through a full hearing. We can keep
our own house in order so that the public does not pick up the phone to call for
radical change, the kinds of "reforms driven by nakedly partisan reasoning" that
caused Justice O'Connor's alarm. 9°
Foremost is making sure that litigants and defendants see more people
who look like them sitting up on the bench. Another arena is continued
vigilance about judicial conduct. In this regard, the Judicial Conference of the
United States has under consideration rules concerning judicial conduct and
disability. 91 This reform was put on the front burner after a couple of
newspaper articles revealed that a small number of federal district and appellate
92
judges had participated in cases in which they held a financial interest.
This is and always has been a clear and unambiguous no-no. All of the
judges asserted that their violation was inadvertent. Certainly, since the
information about the conflicts in those instances was derived from the judges'
own financial disclosure filings,93 no one could say the judge was hiding
anything. Nonetheless, it was an embarrassment to the judiciary and certainly
flagged a need for greater vigilance.

90. Totenberg, supra note 23.
91. The Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability issued their
final recommendations in 2008. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON JUDICIAL
CONDUCT & DISABILITY, RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DIsABILITY PROCEEDINGS

(2008), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judiciahnisconduct/Rules012308.pdf(last
visited Feb. 29, 2008). The proposed rules seek to establish "standards and procedures for
addressing complaints filed by complainants or identified by chief judges, under the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act." Id. at 7.
92. See, e.g., Amelia Hansen, Judge Denies He Had FinancialInterest in Two Cases'
Litigants, DAILY J., Aug. 23, 2006, http://pda-appellateblog.blogspot.com/2006 08 01
archive.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (describing newspaper articles about judges whose
disclosed statements showed they had a financial interest in the litigants) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review); Joe Stephens, Ethics Lapses by Federal Judges Persist,
Review Finds, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A 17 ("A number of federal judges have violated
ethics rules in recent years by presiding over lawsuits while having a financial conflict.").
93. Stephens, supranote 92, at A17.
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This backdrop, as well as the controversy I alluded to surrounding the
Schiavo case, led the then-chairmen of the two Judiciary Committees in
Congress to propose oversight of the judiciary by creation of an Office of the
Inspector General to investigate "possible misconduct in office of judges."' 94
Alongside this development, and in an effort to avoid confrontation with
Congress over judicial independence that such a law might provoke, Chief
Justice Rehnquist appointed a Committee, known as the Breyer Committee, to
study courts' track records on self-policing and to make recommendations for
improvement where needed.95
The Breyer Committee reported that a total of about 700 complaints of
misconduct are filed per year with the chief judges of all the circuits.96 The
overwhelming majority of them are prisoner complaints about ajudge's ruling
on the merits, but a few raise issues that fall under the topic of "conduct
prejudicial to the ...administration of the business of the courts. 97 Under
existing law, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,98 a somewhat
complex procedure to address such complaints exists. 99 But the upshot of the
Breyer Committee Report was a series of recommendations and the
promulgation of rules governing judicial conduct and disability.10 0 The
initiative aims to upgrade information, advice, and assistance to the chief
94. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5219, 109th Cong.
§ 1023 (2005); see also Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 2678,
109th Cong. § 1023 (2005) (providing the Senate version of the bill).
95. See Arthur Hellman, The Regulation ofJudicialEthics in the FederalSystem: A Peek
Behind Closed Doors 27 (University of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law Working Paper Series No. 57,
2007) ("In 2004, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed a committee chaired by Justice
Stephen Breyer to assess how the Judicial Branch has administered the 1980 Act and whether
there are any real problems in its implementation.").
96. See Judicial Conduct & Disability Act Study Comm., Implementation of the Judicial
Conduct andDisabilityAct of 1980, A Report to the ChiefJustice,239 F.R.D. 116, 120(2006)
(explaining the committee's method of evaluation).
97. See id. at 129-32 (detailing the Act's major provisions).
98. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2000).
99. See Judicial Conduct & Disability Act Study Comm., supra note 96, at 144-50
(explaining the judicial branch's analysis of complaints).
100. On March 11, 2008, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved these
rules. Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, National Rules Adopted for Judicial
Conduct and Disability Proceedings (Mar. 11,2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/
2008/judicial conf.cfin (last visited Mar. 17, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Unlike the illustrative rules they replace, "which since 1986 served as a prototype that
could be modified and promulgated separately by an individual judicial council, the governing
entity within each judicial circuit," these new rules, which take effect in April 2008, are binding.
Id. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DIsAILITY, supra
note 91.
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judges who analyze these complaints so they are well educated about their
responsibilities under the Act and to educate judges on an ongoing basis about
their ethical obligations.10 ' It will also let more sunshine in where the public is
concerned so that the public can go to a court's website to find out how to
lodge a complaint; can find out what the disposition was; and can appeal the
disposition to a committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States if
1 02
outcome.
the
with
dissatisfied
The Breyer Committee made clear that the number of "problematic"
dispositions was tiny, problematic "mean[ing] not that the complaint was
meritorious, but that the handling of the complaint deviated from the Act's
requirements; ...

for example, dismissals without adequate investigation or for

the wrong reasons. ' 0 03 Nevertheless, the desire is to reduce the number of
complaints to zero. Certainly, where perception is everything, we judges hope
that this will allay concerns about ethical lapses within the federal judiciary.
Another area in which change in society has to be addressed is the matter
of pro se litigation. As one contributor to the ABA report put it:
Americans pump their own gas, run businesses out of their homes, and
thanks to the Internet, they do everything from diagnose their own
[diseases] to record their own albums to sell anything imaginable that
happens to be lying around the household. Why shouldn't they think they
can represent themselves in court?' 4
In my court, in 2006, 17% of our case filings were pro se. About half of
those were prisoner cases and half were other people. Reports on state courts
indicate about 35% are pro se filings. We have many pro se defendants as well,
in addition to those who simply default because they have no idea what to do.
These litigants either have claims (or defenses) that no lawyer would advocate,
or they can't afford even the costs that a lawyer would demand, much less the
fee.
Whether the claim is worthless, or valid, making sure that unrepresented
people get a hearing is important to maintaining confidence in the courts.
Clarence Gideon wrote his Supreme Court petition in pencil on prison

101. See Judicial Conduct & Disability Act Study Comm., supra note 96, at 209-17
(giving suggestions "aimed primarily at enhancing chiefjudges' and council members' ability to
apply the Act").
102. See id. at 217-18 (giving recommendations to increase public knowledge).
103. Id.
at 120-22.
104. ABA REPORT, supranote 77, at 2 (providing the testimony of David Tevelin, Director,
State Justice Institute).
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stationery, but he is the exception that proves the rule that pro se filers need

help. 105
In the Northern District of Illinois, we have for many years had a trial bar.
To be a member of the trial bar an attorney must accept an appointment to
represent a person who cannot afford a lawyer where the judge believes the
claims appear to have potential merit. 10 6 This has become an established
tradition in which attorneys conscientiously devote their time on a pro bono
basis. The Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the
Illinois Institute for Community Law have prepared handbooks to assist
appointed counsel in the areas of prisoner litigation and employment
discrimination. These handbooks are available on our court's website. 10 7 In
order to recognize the noble work that the attorneys have done, each year the
court, jointly with our local chapter of the Federal Bar Association (FBA),
recognizes with awards some of the attorneys whose work has been particularly
exemplary.
As for the other pro se litigants, for years our court dealt with these cases
on an ad hoc basis, some judges being more attentive than others. Sometimes
their complaints are indecipherable and sometimes not. Because the number of
pro se filings has continued to grow, the court, with the cooperation of the FBA
and the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, has established
a help desk in the clerk's office both in the district court and in the bankruptcy
court. A pro se litigant can make an appointment to speak with a lawyer both
to help assess the case and to guide the filer in preparing documents. This has
been a marvelous help to the judges and I feel sure it increases consumer
satisfaction with the court. I like to think that the help desk might be the safety
valve that would prevent another tragedy like mine.
The final thought I have on keeping our own house in order brings me
back to where I began. Because the Schiavo case garnered such publicity, it
became the focus of both the state and the federal judiciary. It took, literally, an
105.

See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 4 (1966) (providing a description of

Gideon's petitions).
106. See N. DIST. ILL. LoCAL R. 83.11 (g) ("Every member of the trial bar is to be available
for appointment by the court to represent or assist in the representation of those who cannot
afford to hire a member of the trial bar.").
107.

See generally JAMES P. CHAPMAN ET AL., ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITY LAW,

FEDERAL COURT PRISON LITIGATION PROJECT REVISED HANDBOOK,

http://www.ilnd.uscourts.

gov/LEGALUPrlitigation/pri00000.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review);

LAURIE WENDALL & MICHAEL K. FRDKIN, THE CHICAGO LAWYERS'
COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, TITLE VII AND SECTION 1981: A GUIDE FOR
http://www.ilnd.
APPOINTED ATTORNEYS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

uscourts.gov/ATrORNEY/2007Title7manual.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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act of Congress to open the door to the federal court to the parents of Theresa
Schiavo.108 Congress cannot, nor should it, do that for everyone who needs to
be heard. Yet, I question whether, in the jurisprudence ofjudicial restraint, we
have not closed the courthouse doors to too many people. I hope that we do not
become an independent, but unresponsive judiciary.
Few cases go to trial. This means that judges, not juries, are deciding civil
cases through the device of summary judgment. On the criminal side, the
United States Attorney decides cases through the charging decision and plea
negotiations. Judges impose sentences in a courtroom with no one present
other than the lawyers and perhaps a few family members of the defendant.
This means that citizens do not get exposure to the court system through jury
service. It also means that the public is deprived of the very valuable collective
judgment of the citizenry in the administration of justice.
We have many doctrines that keep people's cases from being heard on the
merits: Rooker-Feldman,10 9 standing, abstention, exhaustion of remedies,
qualified immunity, the Eleventh Amendment, forfeiture rules, limitations of
claims, caps on damages, and the like. One constitutional law professor wrote
recently, "[F]ederal courts are often seen as hostile and uncommitted to our
most prized national ideals of equality and justice under the law. They are
frequently seen as institutions dedicated to protecting the status quo and
increasing the power of those who serve it, such as officials of the Executive
Branch."" 0 This statement worries me.
I have been to many induction ceremonies for new judges. As would be
expected, but invariably it is true, each new judge says in one way or another,
without regard to whether they are identified as conservative or liberal or inbetween, that they consider it the highest honor as a lawyer to be part of the
greatest institution in the world, the federal judiciary. Are they thinking of
Gideon, Miranda, and Brown when they say that?' IIlike to think so. When
they wax effusive about the judiciary, at some fundamental level they know, I
believe, that without the ability of the individualto obtain something called real
justice in a court of law we have dissolved the glue that keeps us together as
one nation and drained the life from the freedoms we say we cherish.

108. See supranote 6 and accompanying text (referring to the congressional act regarding
Theresa Marie Schiavo).
109. D.C. Dist. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
110. Irwin P. Stotzky, The ConstitutionalScholar,58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2007).
111. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Brown v. Bd.of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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So it is my hope and prayer that I will do my part, that all of our judges
will do our part, to comport ourselves and interpret the laws and Constitution in
a manner worthy of our office, and that you who are lawyers, future lawyers
and citizens will do your part to preserve and protect the continued
independence of the judiciary by speaking the truth against unwarranted
attacks, by opposing unwise legislation that would compromise the
independence of the Third Branch of government, and by representing those
who, without you, would have no advocate. To quote the words of Edward R.
Murrow: "Otherwise, it's not America."' 12

112.

Wershba, supra note 47.
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